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THE DISSENT OF THE GOVERNORS
STEPHEN L. CARTER*
In Adam, Eve, and the Serpent, Elaine Pagels discusses the
tribulations of the early Christian church, when its members
were tom by the effort to satisfy simultaneously two arguably
inconsistent strands of teaching. The first strand taught that it
was wrong to engage in homosexuality, promiscuity, abortion,
infanticide, and contraception-in short, that it was wrong to
enter into sexual relationships not intended to lead to children
and family. The second demanded that true believers cast off the
traditions of family responsibility and follow God without reser-
vation. The church's first solution was to establish the virtues of
chastity and the value of virginity; the second was to proclaim
the utter corruption of the body. The result in either case was
cataclysmic upheaval. 1
Contemporary liberalism, as a theory of legal and political
obligation, is undergoing an upheaval of its own. On the one
hand, liberalism teaches the importance of the rule of law. On
the other, it teaches the primacy of individual conscience. Like
the early church, liberalism at once demands that individuals
remain within the confines of a set of given institutions and
insists that the individuals are free to follow their own moral
judgments. Unresolved tension results when the commands of
conscience are inconsistent with a particular rule of law. The
traditional liberal solution has been a doctrine of civil disobedi-
ence, but the doctrine has had so many incarnations that it is
difficult to tell whether two theorists who think they disagree are
even arguing about the same thing.
Michael Perry, in his recent book Morality, Politics, and
Law, proposes a partial resolution of the conflict by characteriz-
ing law as the product of moral deliberation within a commu-
nity. The outcome of the deliberation, he says, is not necessarily
binding on dissenters: "Disobedience to law, including resist-
ance to coercive law, is an alternative that remains for the sub-
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jects of law when moral discourse runs out."2 Perry would not,
however, require the disobedient to stand punishment for break-
ing the law: "[T]here is not even a presumptive obligation to
obey alllaws."3 Stated so baldly, this claim is perhaps unexcep-
tionable. For reasons that I shall explain, however, when it is
stated in the course of constructing a deliberative model of
moral judgment, it strikes a slightly awkward chord.
In this Essay, I contend that Perry's attractive vision of a
continuing moral dialogue is more consistent with a somewhat
different proposition: that an individual who considers her soci-
ety essentially a just one has a strong reason to obey all of its
laws, and that if she nevertheless feels compelled by conscience
to disobey that society's laws, she ordinarily should stand pun-
ishment if she follows her compulsion. Rare circumstances
might exist in which evading punishment is appropriate, but in
choosing to do so, the disobedient should recognize that she is
frustrating moral dialogue, not furthering it.
I also extend Perry's model of a morally deliberative soci-
ety, as well as the argument about the obligation to stand pun-
ishment for disobedience, to the case of nonprivate individuals:
elected public officials and judges, especially constitutional
judges. My conclusion is that if the obligation to obey the law
(and, consequently, the obligation to stand punishment for
breaking it) rests on an individual's self-conscious judgment
about the justice of her society, then one who in good faith takes
on a responsible position of governance has a stronger obligation
to obey. One who in good faith takes on the position of judge
has perhaps the strongest obligation of all.
I.
I begin with the proposition that every morally reflective
individual, that is, every person who sometimes judges the
actions of others or of the state against some moral code, will
occasionally perceive the necessity of creating an identity
between her private moral judgment and her public action. I am
not concerned here with her reasons for doing so. I am not even
concerned with whether in some other moral scheme, different
from hers, the imposition of her morality as public law is justi-
fied. I insist only that the time will come when she sees the need
2. M. PERRY, MORALITY, POLITICS, AND LAW 113 (1988).
3. [d.
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to challenge the practices of the state because they do not accord
with her moral judgment. I refer to her effort to secure the
change as moral judgment-in-action because it represents her
response to a private moral call to act.
Moral judgment-in-action may take three forms, which
might be denominated legal, sub-legal, and supra-legal.
Legal action seeks to change the law through the processes
that already exist in the state for that purpose. In the United
States, legal action might include petitioning the legislature or
challenging in the courts the law that individuals perceive as
unjust.
Sub-legal action circumvents the law in a way that is
designed to keep the circumvention from coming to the state's
attention. The Sanctuary Movement, the church-based drive to
save Salvadoran refugees from deportation by shielding them
from the Immigration and Naturalization Service, is an example
of sub-legal action. So is the practice (I am assured by my
friends that it exists) of shuffling figures on one's federal income
tax return in order to avoid providing money for causes that one
dislikes.4
Supra-legal action involves a public appeal to some morality
that is said to be higher than law. The appeal may be religious.
In any case, such action requires a public and open disobedience
of the law. The classic American examples of this appeal are the
sit-ins and other nonviolent disobedient activities associated with
the civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s. A more
recent example is Operation Rescue, in which pro-life activists
have blocked the entrances of facilities in which abortions are
performed.5
Supra-legal action is not necessarily nonviolent action. The
physical restraint of those about to do something the disobedient
actor considers unjust, the bombing of government buildings,
even assassination, are all supra-legal actions, and those who
take these actions generally try to justify them through calling
on some higher moral authority than the authority of the state.
4. Whether this is logical is another matter.
5. Supra-legal action can be further divided into two categories. In the first of these,
the law that persons are violating is itself the subject of protest. The civil rights movement
usually, although not always, selected protest of this sort. In the second category, the law
that is being violated is not itself the unjust law but is violated nevertheless as a part of the
protest. Operation Rescue exemplifies the second form of this protest. Perry considers
each of these equally legitimate, and I believe that he is correct. M. PERRY, supra note 2, at
117-18.
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Not only will nonviolent action sometimes be less effective than
violent action, but, as Perry, among others, points out, nonvio-
lent action at times entails greater social costs than violent
action.6
My reading of Perry is that, as a matter of moral legiti-
macy, all these categories are essentially one. He suggests two
considerations that "should inform the decision whether to dis-
obey a particular law in a particular situation."7 First, in our
morally pluralistic nation, a citizen ought to reflect carefully on
the fallibility of conscience and the plainly differing moral judg-
ments of others before concluding that her moral judgment-in-
action calls for disobedience.8 This conclusion is consistent with
Perry's admirable overall project of encouraging the develop-
ment of a morally conscious, deliberative citizenry, and there-
fore can hardly be objectionable. Second, Perry endorses the
idea of testing the chosen form of disobedience for its propor-
tionality to the harm to be avoided or undone.9 It is difficult to
disagree with such a test.
Perry is evidently prepared to stop here and declare that
disobedience is legitimate. In particular, he does not believe that
disobedient citizens are required either to act publicly in their
disobedience or to stand punishment for what they have done. 10
It is here that Perry and I part company.
Nevertheless, Perry is in good company. Today, the idea
that individuals have a presumptive obligation to obey the law or
stand punishment for their disobedience is looked on as a quaint
relic of a more primitive era in the development of political phi-
losophy. The arguments of Gandhi and King, the twentieth cen-
tury's twin icons of nonviolent resistance, are derided by
contemporary philosophers through omission; they are treated
as mere political polemics, not even worth a serious scholar's
mention, to say nothing of a refutation. II
6. Id. at 116. But see R. DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 108 (1985) ("Of
course, violence and terrorism cannot be justified in this way. If someone's conscience will
not let him obey some law, neither should it let him kill or harm innocent people."); J.
RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 366 (1971) ("To engage in violent acts likely to injure and
to hurt is incompatible with civil disobedience as a mode of address.").
7. M. PERRY, supra note 2, at 115.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 115-17.
10. Id. at 117-19.
I I. For a particularly sensitive discussion of the obligation to face punishment,
incorporating some insights of King and Gandhi, see K. GREENAWALT, CONFLICTS OF
LAW AND MORALITY 230-40 (1987).
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And yet contemporary constitutional theory places an
indispensable reliance on the supposition that people are sup-
posed to do what the courts tell them to do. After all, judicial
activity is not a particularly reliable means of either preserving
the status quo or reforming it if the people are always morally
free to ignore the judges. Today's liberal constitutionalists seem
particularly uncomfortable with the idea that a particular subset
of the people-those who hold public office-are morally free to
ignore the judges. This discomfort helps explain the thundering,
if misdirected, anathemas rained upon former Attorney General
Meese for daring to suggest the right of government officials to
make independent assessments of constitutional meaning,
notwithstanding what a court might have said the document
means. 12 So if the sweep of contemporary political philosophy is
right, then there is something wrong with the institution of judi-
cial review as currently conceived.
That proposition, however, is not Perry's problem. Perry
does indeed believe that there is something wrong with the cur-
rent concept of judicial review. A major purpose of his book is
to reconceptualize judicial review as a species of politics-and
"deliberative, transformative politics" at that. 13 Deliberative
politics, like any dialectical process, requires interlocutors.
Perry's argument is comfortably rounded because he draws what
is in essence a moral equivalence between judges and other indi-
viduals. Judges, Perry asserts, are (or ought to be) free to use
their own moral compasses as guides to constitutional interpre-
tation. 14 But individuals who are the subjects of judicial opin-
ions retain the moral freedom to defy those opinions if moral
deliberation shows them to be unjust. Ultimately, I will return
to this vision of judicial review as dialectic, and will discuss as
well the moral freedom that it gives to judges and to the public.
First, however, it is necessary to say a few more words about
Perry's vision of the source of-or rather, the lack of.-a pre-
sumptive obligation to obey the law, and about the reasons that I
disagree.
II.
From the structure of Perry's argument, it is plain that the
12. See generally Meese, The Law of the Constitution, 61 TuL. L. REV. 979 (1987).
13. M. PERRY, supra note 2, at 151-69.
14. [d. at 149.
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ultimate test for legitimacy of disobedience is individual con-
science. For Perry, the legitimacy of the disobedience is mea-
sured principally by the personal, internal, moral judgment of a
morally reflective individual. But Perry's formula relies on that
individual's judgment about either the justice of the particular
law that she chooses to violate, or the particular practice at
which the protest is aimed. His formula omits a crucial determi-
nant of the morality of the disobedience, namely, the individual's
judgment about the justice of the state itself. My own claim is
that the interaction of different judgments about the state and
different types of disobedience is a good deal more complex. In
particular, I suggest that individuals who believe the state itself
to be essentially just have at least one reason-and quite a strong
one-for standing punishment when they disobey the law.
Now, of course, in order to decide whether disobedient citi-
zens have a moral obligation to stand punishment, it is necessary
to say something ,about their obligation to obey law in the first
place. Hardly anyone continues to believe in social contract
because there is no actual agreement to be bound, and the case
for tacit consent has, on somber reflection, proven to be
shoddy. IS Naturally, lots of theorists have tried to fill the void
with a variety of creative arguments for a presumptive obligation
to ob~y the law in all, most, or some circumstances. I6 Others-
Perry among them-have denied that individuals have even one
strong reason for obeying the law simply because it is the law. 17
I would like to sidestep that debate just a bit, and consider
the possibility that whatever may be the moral obligations of cit-
izens qua citizens, not all citizens are similarly situated. If there
are some citizens for whom there is indeed a strong reason,
amounting to a presumptive obligation, to obey the law just
because it is the law, it follows that at least these individuals
ought to be open and public in disobedience, and to stand pun-
ishment if the society chooses to administer it.
To work out whether such a group might exist, and who its
members might be, it is useful to review Perry's argument
15. See generally J. RAz, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: EsSAYS ON LAW AND
MORALITY (1979); A. SIMMONS, MORAL PRINCIPLES 'AND POLITICAL OBLIGATIONS
(1979); A. WOOZLEY, LAW AND OBEDIENCE: THE ARGUMENTS OF PLATO'S CRITO
(1979).
16. See, e.g., P. SOPER, A THEORY OF LAW 150-51 (1984) (obligation arises from
respect rather than complicity).
17. See generally, J. RAz, supra note 15; R. WOLFF, IN DEFENSE OF ANARCHISM
(1970).
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against the proposition that disobedience of the law must always
be open and that disobedient individuals must be prepared to
face trial. Says Perry:
The position that disobedience must be open or public to be
legitimate is ... untenable. In the United States during the era
of slavery, did those who operated the underground railroad
act illegitimately because they acted covertly? In the present
era, do those who hide Salvadoran refugees illegally in the
United States act illegitimately because they act covertly?
"[P]urposes other than the open protest normally associated
with civil disobedience may underlie a valid claim that disobe-
dience is morally justified. Sometimes a law is so wicked that
the actor rightly acts to circumvent it. The person who con-
trary to the law assisted Jews to escape Nazi Germany acted
morally." IS
Not only that, but for similar reasons there is no obligation to
stand punishment, either:
"If someone was illegally engaged in helping Jews escape
from Nazi Germany, to have given himself up would have
made it impossible for him to continue in that aid. It would
have been perfectly moral for him to try to avoid punishment."
Moreover, if someone helping Jews escape from Nazi Germany
had been detected, he would have been no more obligated to
refrain from attempting to escape Nazi Germany than were the
Jews he had been helping. I9
Obviously, no one will disagree with the force of these views.
But they draw their force significantly from the moral consensus
on the status of the particular regimes that Perry chooses as his
examples. One is a state based on the enslavement of other
human beings, the other a state with a fundamental policy of
genocide.
Consequently, there is a reason that the examples resonate
so powerfully: Both are drawn from regimes that are essentially
unjust. It seems quite unlikely that the disobedient citizens in
Perry's Nazi Germany example were saying to themselves, "The
government isn't so bad if it would just stop killing the Jews";
such a position about the Nazi regime would be morally mon-
strous. More likely, the disobedient Germans would not be
engaged in law reform at all. The judgment to help Jews escape
18. M. PERRY, supra note 2, at 118 (quoting Greenawalt, A Contextual Approach to
Disobedience, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 48, 69 (1970)).
19. Id. (quoting Greenawalt, supra note 18, at 70).
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would be partly moral, but also pragmatic, logical, even the
result of instrumental rationality. Given my goal, the citizen has
asked herself, how best can I attain it? The answer in Nazi Ger-
many was evidently that change-in the sense of saving Jews-
could be brought about only by evading punishment. But note
that changing the law was not the objective of the disobedient
citizen who was hiding Jews. This is not to deny that she would
have celebrated had the law been changed, but she was not hid-
ing Jews in order to convince the state of the futility of its perse-
cution of them. She was hiding them to save their lives.
But of course there is a reason that she was not hiding them
in order to change the law. She undoubtedly disbelieved in the
possibility of changing the law. If a society possesses an unjust
law that will not be changed (except, perhaps, by force), and if
the law is sufficiently unjust, the society itself may be described
as an unjust one. If the society is unjust, then the presumptive
duty to obey its laws is nonexistent. Consequently, the citizen of
Nazi Germany who hid Jews was not engaging in civil disobedi-
ence at all. She was engaging in rebellion, for she denied the
authority of the state in which she lived. In other words, the
Nazi Germany example involves disobedience by those who
challenged the justice not of one law, but of the state itself. In
my view, the same is true of the example drawn from the period
when slavery was legal in the United States.
So Perry's examples say very little about the proper moral
consequences of disobedience in the United States. No doubt
there are disobedient citizens of the United States who also deny
the state's authority, and who also consider the government fun-
damentally unjust and therefore consider themselves freed trom
any presumptive duty to obey its laws. For such citizens, the
decision that moral judgment-in-action requires sheltering one's
self from prosecution will often be an easy one. As Perry himself
points out, however: "Nazi Germany is one context. By any
plausible standard, contemporary American society is quite
another."20
Most Americans probably consider their government-
their society-essentially just, and my empirical hunch is that
most Americans consider the laws promulgated by their govern-
ment presumptively entitled to respect. But although Perry con-
cedes that the United States as a society is radically different
20. Id.
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from Nazi Germany, he nevertheless declines to endorse the
proposition that disobedience of American law by American citi-
zens who consider their society a just one mi§ht carry an obliga-
tion that is different from the one that might have attached to
disobedience of Nazi law by German citizens who considered
their society an unjust one.
The point is that Perry does not consider the possibility that
the individual's own assessment of the justice or injustice of her
society can and should carry moral force in her decision on
whether the society's laws are presumptively entitled to obedi-
ence. It may be that there exist out there in America (albeit
relatively far from the academy) vast numbers of individuals
with a deep and abiding faith in the essential justice of their
nation's institutions, a faith which leads them to presume, in
their own minds, that the commands of law are entitled to
obedience.
If faith of this kind exists, it is not consent in the con-
tractarian sense. The faith would, however, playa large role-
perhaps the major role-in the decisions by those individuals
who shared it on whether disobedience of law was right or
wrong. Thus, for the purpose of determining obligation, the
faith might plausibly be described as the functional equivalent of
consent.
This seems to be what Joseph Raz has in mind when he
presents, in The Morality of Freedom, his vision of an organic
relationship between individual and community that rests on the
citizen's self-conscious respect for her community's law. Raz, it
should be pointed out, is essentially a philosophical anarchist,
one who denies the existence of a presumptive obligation to obey
the law simply because it is the law.21 He does not believe that
consent is possible. But neither does he believe that consent in
the social contract sense is even necessary to confer an obliga-
tion. Rather, the sense of respect that he describes, one in which
the citizen seems almost to will an obligation, need not "be
related to any act performed in the belief that it has normative
consequences."22 This sense of respect for law, the self-con-
scious, willed belief in one's own obligation to obey, is something
that evolves over time, not something that arrives at a moment:
21. See generally J. RAZ, supra note 15.
22. J. RAz, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 98 (1986) [hereinafter MORALITY]. This
process is similar to what J.L. Mackie has called an "invented" obligation. See Mackie,
Obligations to Obey the Law, 67 VA. L. REV. 143, 151 (1981).
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"It is likely to be the product of a gradual process as lengthy as
the process of acquiring a sense of belonging to a community
and identifying with it."23 In other words, the sense of respect is
an emergent attitude, the product not of conscious decision to be
bound but of a variety of social forces that combine to produce
it. It is not consent. "But in a reasonably just society this belief
in an obligation to obey the law, this attitude of respect for law,
is as valid as an obligation acquired through consent and for
.precisely the same reasons. "24
Raz's principal point is that the obligation to obey the law
simply because of its status in society as law might stem from
attitudinal rather than consensual sources. His suggestion is
that the individual who believes for whatever reason that her
society is a just one and that its laws are presumptively entitled
to respect stands on a different footing from other citizens.
Moreover, her footing is in the place that matters most, the place
at which moral deliberation on whether to obey the law takes
place: her own mind. When this citizen must decide whether to
obey a law or whether her moral judgment-in-action counsels
disobedience, she begins at a point that is different from the one
at which 'Perry and others start. She begins with the belief that
obedience is obligatory. This belief, whatever its source, sharply
alters the debate over whether she ought to stand punishment if
she disobeys.
When one tries to generate an obligation based on this per-
ception, one runs into a problem: The citizens who take this
view naturally imagine that their obligation to obey the law
comes not from their belief that the obligation exists, but from
some other, unstated source. Thus, there is an unsettling recur-
sive character to basing authority on this belief; there is a reason
to obey the law because the belief exists, and the belief exists
because there is a reason to obey the law, and so on. Worse, the
citizens who hold the belief are likely unaware of its self-refer-
encing character, because they also believe that something else
out there provides the source of their obligation.
Raz answers the objection this way. "But ill-articulated as
many people's thoughts sometimes are in substance, they often
amount to an assumption of semi-voluntary performative sub-
mission to an authority, because it is a morally worthwhile atti-
23. J. RAZ, MORALITY, supra note 22, at 98.
24. Id.
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tude to have."25 For the purpose of considering disobedience as
moral judgment-in-action, this response is entirely sufficient
because I am testing the legitimacy of disobedience only against
the individual's own conception of the justice or injustice of the
state in which the disobedience takes place. This limitation
seems entirely sensible, for the true disobedient is rarely commit-
ted to the state's destruction. As Ronald Dworkin has put the
point: "Civil disobedience, in all its various forms and strate-
gies, has a stormy and complex relationship with majority rule.
It does not reject the principle entirely, as a radical revolution-
ary might; civil disobedients remain democrats at heart."26
Dworkin's generalization does not of course describe all
civil disobedients, but it is true of many and perhaps most. Once
this affection for majority-rule democracy exists, its source
scarcely matters. Nevertheless, it is important to distinguish
Raz's argument, and my use of it, from the proposition that
there exists a special obligation to obey laws that are generated
through the democratic process. Perry quite correctly points out
that even a democratic society can produce very bad laws. He
echoes Kent Greenawalt's claim that the moral case for disobe-
dience in Nazi Germany would not have been weakened had
Hitler been elected democratically or had a majority of Germans
approved genocide.27 But the case for a presumptive obligation
to obey the laws of a just society does not turn on whether that
society styles itself as democratic. It turns, as Perry correctly
notes, on the individual's moral judgment. That individual
moral judgment may be addressed to a larger target than any
particular law; judgment can be passed on the society as a whole.
Surely the respect that underlies the obligation to obey can be
shattered in a radically discontinuous manner by a radically
unjust result of democratic processes. A law may be so bad that
it sunders not merely the presumptive obligation to obey that
particular law, but also the self-conscious link of the individual
to the community. Perry's Nazi Germany example is surely at
best a law of this kind.
Thus, that the democratic processes are available has no
necessary bearing on whether an individual has at least one
strong reason to obey the state's laws. Similarly, in Raz's for-
mulation of the evolutionary, emergent attitude of respect for
25. Id.
26. R. DWORKIN, supra note 6, at 110.
27. M. PERRY, supra note 2, at 119.
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law, it is enough that the citizen believes that her attitude of
presumptive obligation is morally worthwhile, whatever her
"true" reasons. Once she believes this, the question whether she
can consistently disobey the laws of the state and yet seek to
avoid punishment is prominently posed.
Simplifying Raz's model for the sake of clarity and brevity,
imagine that there are two possible conceptions that the individ-
ual who is considering disobedience might hold about the state:
(1) I reside within a state that I consider essentially an unjust
one, although it promulgates some just laws; (2) I reside within
a state that I consider essentially a just one, although it
promulgates some unjust laws.
The first category is easily disposed of. On Raz's model,
individuals in that category are unlikely to consider themselves
generally bound by the laws of the state. Because the individ-
ual's own belief.-however formed-is the font of obligations,
individuals who consider themselves not bound by the state at
all have no presumptive obligation to obey its laws.28 For these
individuals, Perry's argument works perfectly. They may delib-
erate in a morally reflective way over disobedience and consider
the possibility of moral error. Once they believe that moral
judgment-in-action requires disobedience, however, the only
question remaining is one of proportionality. There is no obliga-
tion to be public and to stand punishment because there is no
obligation to the state itself.29
What about individuals in the second category? They con-
sider their state essentially just, so by hypothesis, they consider
that they have a presumptive obligation to obey its laws.
This presumptive obligation-the one strong reason to
obey-flows from the individual's internal moral judgment
28. Obviously, they might decide to obey for practical reasons of self-interest.
Besides, "opposing an illegitimate or unjust state does not always (though it may often)
mean disobeying its laws. There sometimes may be other means that not only are more
effective, but have greater moral legitimacy." Holmes, State-Legitimacy and the Obligation
to Obey the Law, 67 VA. L. REV. 133, 141 (1981). ,
29. Of course, one might object that many and perhaps most individuals have no
settled opinion on whether their society is ajust one. This theory might be so, although my
suspicion is that in the United States, at least, the great majority of citizens do indeed have
strongly held views. That view is no more than an empirical hunch, and it is entitled to
very little weight. But it is not necessary to my argument that most people have settled
views. I am interested in the source of obligation, not the source of lack of obligation. My
only claim is that those individuals who do consider their society essentially a just one have
at least one strong reason to obey its law simply because it is the law. Whether anyone else
has a reason or not is not important to the project.
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about the state.. If that judgment entails a self-conscious respect
for the laws of the state, an emergent sense of justice, then it
might fairly be said that the individual holds the state to be just.
In the remainder of this paper, when I refer to the individual
who considers her state essentially just, I will have in mind this
emergent, self-conscious respect for law. It is to the implications
of this attitude, and to the specification of some of those who
might hold it, that I now tum.
III.
Martin Luther King, Jr., the principal exponent of nonvio-
lent resistance to unjust law during the American civil rights
movement, held that the individual whose moral judgment-in-
action moved her to disobey the law had a moral obligation to
stand punishment. His reasons are instructive, and, for people
who consider the state essentially just, they are to my mind unre-
futed as well.
King laid out his thesis squarely in an address that he gave
in 1961: "I submit that the individual who disobeys the law,
whose conscience tells him it is unjust and who is willing to
accept the penalty by staying in jail until that law is altered, is
expressing at the moment the very highest respect for law."30
The thesis over the years has been the subject of much criticism
and debate, and, as Perry's book illustrates, it is not a popular
thesis among contemporary philosophers. But its ringing,
aspirational justification squares better than the alternatives with
the vision of a presumptive obligation based on an emergent self-
conscious belief that the society is a just one and that its law is
presumptively entitled to respect.
For King, disobedience had one purpose: change. And for
a citizen who believes her society essentially just, change is nec-
essarily the reason for moral judgment-in-action because her
faith in society's justice carries with it an optimism about the
society's capacity to undo its injustice. This is why King's diso-
bedience was relentlessly optimistic, why he premised his justifi-
cation for disobedience on the supposition that the hearts of
others could be moved by the spectacle of the state's oppression.
In this sense, he believed in the essential justice of the state,
30. M. KING, Love. Law. and Civil Disobedience, in A TESTAMENT OF HOPE: THE
EsSENTIAL WRITINGS OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 43, 49 (J. Washington ed. 1986)
[hereinafter A TESTAMENT OF HOPE].
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which is why he was able to say, in accepting the Nobel Peace
Prize in 1964: "I refuse to accept the view that mankind is so
tragically bound to the starless midnight of racism and war that
the bright daybreak of peace and brotherhood can never become
a reality."31 King believed in a state comprising essentially
decent people who would finally be willing to change its laws.
Consequently, his vision of the state and its people was much
like the vision that animates contemporary liberal political the-
ory, and Perry's book, too: a vision of reflective, deliberative
individuals who are willing to engage in dialogue about policy
and to change their minds if convinced that they are wrong.32
King's optimism, his sense that dialogue, once joined, can
lead to change, is illustrated by his Letterfrom Birmingham City
Jail, in which he wrote: "Nonviolent direct action seeks to cre-
ate ... a crisis and establish such creative tension that a commu-
nity that has constantly refused to negotiate is forced to confront
the issue. It seeks so to dramatize the issue that it can no longer
be ignored."33 The idea was to change the system by changing
the minds and hearts of the people who ran it. This faith in
dialogue was intimately linked to his justification for the claim
that the disobedient citizen should stand punishment. Thus, in
the same essay, he penned this well-known passage:
In no sense do I advocate evading or defying the law as the
rabid segregationist would do. This would lead to anarchy.
One who breaks an unjust law must do it openly, lovingly (not
hatefully as the white mothers did in New Orleans when they
were seen on television screaming, "nigger, nigger, nigger"),
and with a willingness to accept the penalty. I submit that an
individual who breaks a law that conscience tells him is unjust,
and willingly accepts the penalty by staying in jail to arouse the
conscience of the community over its injustice, is in reality
expressing the very highest respect for law.34
Clearly, this argument makes sense only if one accepts the essen-
tial justness of the state. One who believes the state unjust can
have little hope that an open and loving act of disobedience will
accomplish very much (although, in the right circumstances, it
might accomplish a little). But one who believes that the state is
31. M. KING, Nobel Prize Acceptance Speech, in A TESTAMENT OF HOPE, supra note
30, at 224, 225-26.
32. I return to this dialogic metaphor in the next section.
33. M. KING, Letter from Birmingham City Jail, in A TESTAMENT OF HOPE, supra
note 30, at 289, 291. -
34. Id. at 294.
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essentially just necessarily believes that unjust laws can be
changed. She shares the personal moral judgment of most of her
fellow citizens, a judgment that counsels a respect for law and a
presumptive obligation to obey. She can show no greater love
for the ideal of just law and no greater faith in the capacity of
just societies to change than by submitting herself to punishment
under the law that is unjust.
King's argument seems entirely persuasive for those indi-
viduals whose goal in disobedience is change. Even in a just
society, however, there are other goals that might prompt diso-
bedience. The principal "other goal" is circumvention-not so
much changing the law as avoiding its effect. To the circum-
venter, avoiding punishment is the point of the strategy. I agree
with Perry that the judgment on whether moral judgment-in-
action counsels disobedience must ultimately be left to each indi-
vidual. I would argue, however, that even those who consider
circumvention morally desirable should respect the force of the
presumptive obligation to obey that flows from an emergent,
self-conscious belief that the society is essentially just. Plainly,
the circumventers will sometimes reject the obligation to obey-
and, in consequence, will reject the obligation to stand punish-
ment-but they should do so only after a deliberative process
that includes the arguments for presumptive obedience that I
have discussed.
In our society, curiously, circumvention is surely the most
common form of disobedience. After all, as Perry notes, "There
seem to be some situations in which my obedience to some laws
would benefit no one and my disobedience harm no one-for
example, my making a U-turn on the street in front of my house
at two in the morning."35 He also repeats Greenawalt's example
of individuals who exceed the speed limit at four in the morning
or trespass far from anyone's sight.36 These are not examples of
moral judgment-in-action, however, except in a very crude
sense, and the moral justification for avoiding punishment does
not seem particularly strong. They are examples, rather, of per-
sonal convenience, of putting self-interest ahead of community
judgment on legal norms. In this sense, the individuals in the
examples are not civil disobedients at all, at least not in the tradi-
tional sense-they are simple, humdrum lawbreakers. They are
35. M. PERRY, supra note 2, at 108.
36. Id. at 108-09 (quoting Greenawalt, Promise, Benefit, and Need: Ties That Bind
Us to the Law, 18 GA. L. REV. 727, 763 (1984)).
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not, in Ronald Dworkin's phrase, engaged in activity that is
"very different from ordinary criminal activity motivated by self-
ishness or anger or cruelty or madness."37 They are simply try-
ing to get away with something, and figuring, no doubt
correctly, that it is not worth anyone's trouble to prosecute
them. But they are making no moral claim. Were it worthwhile
to prosecute-were the town to announce a sudden crackdown
on early morning speeders (indeed, were a police car to appear in
the rearview mirror)-the speeder would no doubt slow down.
Were the rancher suddenly to appear with a shotgun, the tres-
passer would surely scurry for safer territory.
It seems entirely plausible, moreover, that when Michael
Perry makes his U-turn at two in the morning, he conceives of
himself not as protesting the law, and not even as violating it,
but rather as interpreting it. Perhaps he is thinking, "The rule
against U-turns could not have been intended to cover this situa-
tion. I will interpret it in accordance with its purpose-as a
safety rule-in order to make sense of its terms in the real world
in which they must be applied." Perhaps the law enforcement
authorities might even connive in this interpretation. Cognitive
dissonance problems aside, if this is what Perry really believes,
then he may not be disobedient at all; certainly he is not disobe-
dient in the strong sense of an individual whose moral judgment-
in-action compels disobedience because the law is unjust.
Perry appends the example of a black person who uses a
"whites only" bathroom, asking: "In what way does a black
person's violation of the law contravene the norm of fairness?"38
The answer is that if the black person does it for convenience
alone, without regard to moral judgment about the law itself,
then the black person is arguably in the same position as the
early-morning speeder: both are humdrum lawbreakers mak-
ing no moral claim. If, on the other hand, the black person is
engaged in a strategy of circumvention, then the goal is to
change the law. If the black person considers the state itself
essentially unjust, then there is little to be gained by standing
punishment. If, however, the black person considers the state
essentially just, then we are back once more to the civil rights
movement, and the protester must confront King's argument
that when moral judgment-in-action counsels disobedience of
37. R. DWORKIN, supra note 6, at 105.
38. M. PERRY, supra note 2, at 109.
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the laws of an essentially just society, she shows the highest
respect for the ideal of just law when she stands punishment. If
she seeks to avoid punishment, she is challenging the justness
not simply of the law but-at least implicitly-of the society
that has enacted it.
But again, note why this is so. The goal of King's disobedi-
ence was to provoke dialogue; the goal of the dialogue was
change. In his vision, a just society was one that could be
inspired by the open and loving defiance of others to change the
objectionable laws. Conversely, a society that could not be
moved by nonviolent protest was not really a just one. If the
black person who uses the bathroom reserved for whites is trying
to change the law but also considers the society essentially just,
then she has a strong reason for standing punishment for her
disobedience. Consequently, she has good reason to reject the
strategy of circumvention.
It is possible, however, to envision situations in which an
individual might consider her society a just one, and therefore
concede a strong presumption in favor of standing punishment
for disobedience. Nevertheless she may reject the presumption
in favor of circumvention. I have in mind the situation of some-
thing like the Sanctuary Movement, which stands on a different
footing because of its different goal.
There is no doubt that the consciences-the personal moral
judgments-of the Movement's members counsel disobedience
and insist that returning Salvadoran refugees, or passively
allowing their arrest and deportation, is wrong. According to
King's argument, if they consider the law unjust and the state
just,39 the members of the Movement ought to stand punish-
ment. Before the law, they are no different from the individual
whose disobedience takes the form of exceeding the speed limit
at some convenient hour. Their presumptive obligation to the
state, which by hypothesis they accept as just, is to make their
case by legal means and, if they choose supra-legal means, to let
the punishment itself serve as their argument.
But the obligation is only presumptive. Although it gives
the individuals in question one strong reason to obey the law or
39. I am assuming that the members of the Sanctuary Movement do not consider the
state to be essentially unjust. If they do, then there is no moral dilemma. Similarly, I take
no position on those members who have no settled view on the justice or injustice of the
state. I am considering only those members of the Movement who consider the state to be
essentially just.
HeinOnline -- 63 Tul. L. Rev. 1342 1988-1989
1342 TULANE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63
stand punishment, the presumption can be rebutted. The mem-
bers of the Sanctuary Movement; by choosing the strategy of
circumvention, have in effect proclaimed their rebuttal of the
presumption in their particular case. The proclamation is one
that is worth a closer look.
Although in most ways the Sanctuary Movement is in pre-
cisely the same position as any other disobedient group, it differs
in one crucial respect. The Movement's goal is not simply to
change the law, but also to save the refugees. If the disobedience
is open, if the members of the Movement must stand punish-
ment, then saving the refugees might be impossible.. For the
Movement's adherents, this difference is plainly sufficient to
place their circumvention in a different moral light.
The decision that moral judgment-in-action is necessary is
ultimately a personal one. So is the decision about the appropri-
ate form that the action should take. Like Perry, I am disin-
clined to look behind either decision, except to exhort morally
aware individuals to accept the possibility of learning from the
often quite different moral sentiments of others. As a conse-
quence, it would be presumptuous for me to suggest that the
Movement's preference for circumvention over open defiance is
in any sense morally problematic. I would rather point out two
analytical difficulties that those considering circumvention as a
strategy should consider.
First, it is quite conceivable that any disobedient individual
could recast her moral judgment-in-action to say that her pur-
pose is not simply to protest the law, but that morality requires
her to avoid its effects. Indeed, the protester will often be
tempted to do so. As Carl Cohen has stated, however, "Such
claims are often mistaken and are sometimes outrageous."40 So,
for example, the tax protester might say that it is not only the
immorality of the tax that is her concern, but also the immoral-
ity of the jail sentence that follows upon conviction. No one
could say that this is wrong, but it does not seem a particularly
appealing case when weighed against King's lofty rhetoric on
open and loving defiance. The principal point, then, is that an
individual convinced of the justice of her society and the injus-
tice of one of its laws ought to search her soul to be very sure
that circumvention really is the only effective strategy.
40. c. COHEN, CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE: CONSCIENCE, TACTICS, AND THE LAW 103
(1971).
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Second, the claim that the Sanctuary Movement, or any
other protest movement, stands on a different footing because of
the necessity of secrecy reduces moral judgment to a question of
instrumental rationality-the issue is not the ends, but the
means. The goal is no longer changing the law by changing the
hearts of the lawgivers, nor is it to engage in a dialogue; instead,
the goal is freedom to act as though the objectionable law did
not exist. In a sense, the goal is a laudable one, for it is difficult
to criticize any individuals for acting out the dictates of con-
science. And yet it is not easy to see how circumvention as a
strategy advances the public dialogue that, according to Perry,
ought to characterize our societal reflection on tough moral
issues. Here I am reminded of John Rawls's admittedly contro-
versial defense of the principle that civil disobedience ought to
be public:
A further point is that civil disobedience is a public act.
Not only is it addressed to public principles, it is done in pub-
lic. It is engaged in openly with fair notice; it is not covert or
secretive. One may compare it to public speech, and being a
form of address, an expression of profound and conscientious
political conviction, it takes place in the public forum.41
Perry, I think, would respond with a stubborn "Sez who?," and
as a matter of political argument, the response is entirely ade-
quate. Still, the proposition that conscience can lead to a quiet
and hidden circumvention of the law, without necessary legal
consequences for the protesters, should sit uneasily upon the
consciences of individuals who believe in dialogue and who con-
sider the law of their society presumptively worthy of respect
because the society itself is essentially just.
IV.
Another consideration that weighs in favor of openness of
disobedience in a state that is essentially just is the commitment
that such a society ought to have to public moral dialogue as the
preferred means for resolving difficult questions of policy. For
those who view the liberal state as a place in which citizens
undertake rational deliberations about morality and policy, the
principle of dialogue has an obvious appeal. The Enlightenment
emphasized the ability of humans to come to moral conclusions
through exercising their faculty of reason, and the Neo-Enlight-
41. J. RAWLS, supra note 6, at 366.
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enment liberals of the current era make the exercise of reason
the rule-that is, conclusions that are reached through less
rational decision processes (as liberalism defines rationality) are
excluded from the universe of discourse.42 The rationality
requirement is in theory a mediating force. It permits communi-
ties with different moral and epistemological premises to argue
with one another over policy, so long as they are willing to put
aside their respective preferred means of understanding the
world in order to engage in the form of dialogue that is available
to everyone.
In general, I find this model attractive, although I confess
to some dissatisfaction with the use of a rationality requirement .
as the tool that mediates the dialogue.43 My own preference-
and, I suspect, Michael Perry's as well-is to envision such a
world as one in which citizens may enter the dialogue in ways
and at times of their own choosing, but in which they are
encouraged to be morally reflective both prior to and subsequent
to entrance. The advantage of dialogue so understood is that it
includes individuals whose concepts of how fundamental moral-
ity is discovered might be at war with the liberal notion of
rationality. This is a difference that matters, because a dialogue
that excludes dissenters by defining their views as irrelevant is
not a truly liberal one. Everyone would be welcome, provided
only that they sought to be morally reflective and to listen gener-
ously to the counsels of their opponents.44
In a world of reflective, self-aware individuals who are gen-
erous and who treat fellow citizens with respect, it is difficult to
understand why any particular form of dialogue must be
excluded ex ante. As Perry points out, to try to envision a reflec-
tive and self-aware individual who separates her basic moral
convictions (including her religious convictions) from the rest of
42. For examples of efforts to discover moral truth through dialogue, see generally B.
ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1980); J. RAWLS, supra note 6.
The claim that deliberation can lead to moral consensus undergirds some theories of free
speech, see, e.g., A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM (1965), and much of the so-called
"republican revival" in contemporary constitutional theory, s~e, e.g., Michelman, Law's
Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988).
43. See Carter, The Religiously Devout Judge (forthcoming in NOTRE DAME L.
REV.).
44. For the religiously devout, as Perry suggests, this reflection might take the form
of prayer-{)f seeking in commonality with other believers a fuller understanding of God's
will-and, upon entrance into the dialogue, the form of humility as well. For whatever the
status of a sacred text may be, the individual who is trying to divine God's will and bring it
into the secular world is only mortal.
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her world view is to imagine a poorly integrated personality, for
the effort would destroy anyone else as a person.45 On the other
hand, once the religiously devout citizen, or any other citizen,
chooses to participate in public dialogue, she commits herself to
listen as well as to speak, and to think and act in a reflective and
generous spirit.
Martin Luther King's emphasis on faith and love in disobe-
dience obviously reflects such a spirit. The individual who, in
Raz's terms, has evolved a conscious respect for law and has
come to believe in her own obligation to obey, acts with similar
faith and love when she takes her disobedience public. In openly
resisting the law in order to change it, she is inviting dialogue;
indeed, she is insisting on it, "provoking" it, in King's terms.
And in the process she is demonstrating her respect for her fel-
low citizens and for their quite different conceptions ofjustice by
submitting to their will. She may lose out in the dialogue, but
she will not lose the morally worthy satisfaction of having acted
correctly.
This vision of public dialogue makes bedfellows of two quite
different groups recently involved in disobedient behavior: the
pro-life activists of Operation Rescue and the advisers to the
family of Tawana Brawley. Participants in Operation Rescue
are called by their moral judgments-in-action to use a variety of
tactics, including blocking the entrances to clinics where abor-
tions are performed, praying, chanting, singing, and sometimes
calling names, in an effort to change the minds of those seeking
abortions and of those performing them, or perhaps to make it
physically impossible for the participants to enter the buildings,
or at the very least, to embarrass them or bring about second
thoughts. The participants are quite willing to be arrested and
to stand punishment. They seem to believe that in so doing they
are keeping a dialogue alive, and at the same time showing the
highest respect for law.46
45. M. PERRY, supra note 2, at 72-73. "[A] person-a 'self'-is partly constituted by
her moral convictions .... To bracket them would be to bracket-indeed, to annihilate-
herself." See also id. at 61-62 (using this argument to criticize Rawls). Cj. P. TILLICH,
DYNAMICS OF FAITH 106 (1957): "Faith, therefore, is not a matter of the mind in
isolation, or of the soul in contrast to mind and body, or of the body (in the sense of animal
faith), but is the centered movement of the whole personality toward something of ultimate
meaning and significance."
46. Not all pro-life activists agree with the tactics of Operation Rescue. The
Reverend Charles Stanley of the First Baptist Church of Atlanta, a prominent figure in
the pro-life movement, has circulated a flyer entitled A Biblical Perspective on Civil
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The advisers to the Brawley family refused to permit their
clients to cooperate with law enforcement authorities investigat-
ing Tawana Brawley's alleged abduction and rape. The goal of
this noncooperation, the advisers said, was to protest the racism
said to be endemic in the system of criminal justice. The many
people who said that the Brawley advisers were wrong may have
paid too much attention to the advisers' silly and often offensive
rabble-rousing rhetoric, and too little to their strategic position.
Their strategic position was to try to force officialdom either to
run the investigation as the family advisers believed that it
should be run or to show its ugly, racist face (as the advisers
apparently conceived it). They tried to do this by withholding
their own cooperation. In so doing, their hope may have been to
promote a public dialogue on the extent of racism in the criminal
justice system. One may like or dislike this strategy-as it hap-
pens, I think they had matters exactly backwards47-but the
strategy (as against the rhetoric) was neither evil nor ridiculous.
To be sure, the Brawley advisers are not perhaps the most
appealing group of pure moral agents that one might envision,
but their public image should not detract from the analytical
point; to wit, that their strategy of public noncooperation can
certainly be cast as moraljudgment-in-action by individuals who
consider their society essentially just.
Disobedience, in which he takes the members of Operation Rescue to task for what he
describes as a misunderstanding of God's law. They cannot, Stanley says, break laws
prohibiting trespass and the like in order to protest the sins of others. C. STANLEY, A
BIBLICAL PERSPECTIVE ON CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE (copy on file with author). Similarly, in
King's day, any number of clergy and others who proclaimed their allegiance to his goals
sharply disputed his tactics.
47. The reason I say that the Brawley advisers had matters exactly backwards is that
even if one takes them at their word in explaini.ng why they picked the strategy that they
did, the way to get officialdom to show its ugly, racist face, ifit has one, is to cooperate and
then show that nothing came of it. Otherwise, the claim that nothing good can possibly
come from cooperation is likely to ring a little hollow with most listeners, and hollow-
sounding rhetoric produces few results. It is one thing for King to parade in Birmingham
without a permit, when the American public was already primed to believe that the system
being protested was an evil and oppressive one; it is something else for the Brawley family
advisers to counsel noncooperation with a system that most of the public probably does not
regard as racist. If officialdom punishes Dr. King, then the ugly, racist face is revealed; it
officialdom ignores the posturing of the Brawley advisers, then it is the fault of the advisers
themselves. The strategy was wrong, in short, not because the strategy of noncooperation
is always wrong, but because it was selected in circumstances when it could not have
achieved what its proponents hoped. Their persistence in the face of the obvious failure of
the strategy is surely the reason that so many came to doubt the bona fide issues of the
underlying story (even before the grand jury rejected it) and, in consequence, came to doubt
the good faith of the advisers in selecting the strategy.
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The point is that the Brawley advisers and the Yonkers City
Council and many other controversial disobedients all have in
common the selection of strategies that are sufficiently provoca-
tive that public dialogue is bound to occur. The dialogue will
not always be as reflective and generous as Perry's approach sug-
gests that it should be; and yet even a raucous and angry argu-
ment is better than silence. Underlying any disobedience aimed
at change is a fairly simple strategy: whatever the society might
decide to do to the disobedient individual, it will not be done
quietly.
This, finally, is the reason that disobedience is morally legit-
imate even among individuals who consider their society essen-
tially just, but that, at the same time, those individuals have a
strong reason to be open in their disobedience and accept pun-
ishment. Punishment is a social act. It is not simply something
that the society does, but something that the society does to
someone, and in a just society, the fact of punishment is difficult
to ignore because the subject of the punishment is a real person.
The punishment itself sparks a dialogue. The loving and faithful
acceptance of it shows the highest respect for the rule of law and
also for the moral vision of the rest of the society, the rest of the
people. Disobedient individuals, in short, ought to consider the
lesson that Bickel and others have tried to teach the courts: If
the people don't matter, neither does anything else.
v.
Alexander Bickel's lesson, if I may call it that, character-
ized his writing throughout his career, but culminated in his
most controversial work, The Morality of Consent, which was
published after his death. There he admonished the courts that
their decisions were all part of an "endlessly renewed educa-
tional conversation" between the judges and the public that
must finally decide whether to obey their edicts.48 For Bickel,
public protest was, over the long run, a sign that something was
wrong, that perhaps the court had made a mistake, which is why
he added the stern admonition that the dialogue he contem-
plated "is a conversation, not a monologue."49
Since that time, scholars have argued over the limitations of
48. A. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 111 (1975). Much of the textual
discussion here was anticipated in Carter, The Morgan "Power" and the Forced
Reconsideration of Constitutional Decisions, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 819, 851-62 (1986).
49. A. BICKEL, supra note 48, at 111.
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the Bickelian metaphor: Was he proposing open defiance as a
check on the courts? Certainly his work can be read that way,
although his commitment to the rule of law makes such an inter-
pretation suspect. My own view, however, is that at the very
least, a commitment to public dialogue is necessary to make
sense of the moral dimension of constitutional adjudication, at
least under the broadly worded clauses that aim at the protec-
tion of individual rights. The judges who are called upon to
decide the meanings of these clauses are thrown far more on
their own resources-including their moral resources-than are
the judges considering the interpretation of the structural
clauses.50 There are as many theories on what the judges should
do in interpreting the individual rights clauses as there are theo-
rists who have pondered the question. What is plain, however, is
that sensitive judges can hardly avoid letting their own moral
assessments playa role, and the more obscure the constitutional
language, the more morally aware the judge, the greater the role
that her personal moral judgment is likely to play.
Judges work hard at the pretense that they are enforcing
someone else's moral vision-the vision of the founders, for
example, or of the larger society-rather than their own. Per-
haps the judges truly believe it. The psychological pressure to
believe it is intense. One reason is that the prescriptive norms of
adjudication seem to require interpretation without the interfer-
ence of the judge's own values. Another is that sensitive judges
are certainly aware of the enormous potential authority that they
wield in this society, especially when interpreting the Constitu-
tion, and of the enormous potential for that authority's abuse.
For both of those reasons, it is sensible to conclude that the
more that judges have to rely on their own moral judgments, the
less certain they should be of their rightness. This was Alexan-
der Bickel's original, controversial insight when he described the
process of judicial review as conversation rather than mono-
logue, and it is one that Perry, elsewhere in his book, in large
measure endorses. After describing judicial review as essentially
aspirational in nature, Perry has this to say:
A thoughtful judge will rely on her own beliefs as to what the
aspiration requires only after forming those beliefs, or at least
50. I have elsewhere worked out this distinction in greater detail. See Carter, From
Sick Chicken to Synar: The Evolution and Subsequent De-Evolution of the Separation of
Powers, 1987 B.Y.U. L. REV. 719, 722-60 (theory); Carter, The Independent Counsel Mess,
102 HARV. L. REV. 105, 118-28 (1988) (practice).
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testing them, in the crucible of dialogic encounter with the wis-
dom of the past, of the tradition, including original beliefs, pre-
cedent, and anything else relevant and helpful. . .. Moreover,
the thoughtful judge will rely on her own beliefs only after
forming or testing them in the crucible of dialogic encounter
with the beliefs of her contemporaries, in particular, other
judges struggling with the same or similar problems.51
I have never been entirely comfortable with the free-wheeling
review of the sort that judges tend to indulge under the individ-
ual right clauses of the Constitution. My confidence would be
increased, however, were I more sure that the judges who inter-
pret those clauses follow Perry's advice and recognize the fragil-
ity and fallibility of their own moral judgments. Such judges
would be willing to pay generous and thoughtful attention to the
moral judgments-in-action of the people who dispute them.52
The principal point of joining the concept of civil disobedi-
ence to judicial review is that court decisions are law, and mor-
ally reflective individuals might sometimes consider them unjust.
In the continuing conversation of the Bickelian metaphor, judges
have an obligation to pay attention to the popular response to
their activity. What is often worrisome is that the response,
especially when the judicial action is controversial, might well
take the form of organized defiance. This insight has always
been a part of our constitutional heritage, but it tends to leave
liberal reformers a bit nervous. It is one thing to praise Lincoln
for talking bravely, if vaguely, of defying Dred Scott v. Sand-
ford,s3 but when the committed segregationists of the 1950s and
51. M. PERRY, supra note 2, at 150-51 (emphasis in original).
52. Perhaps a fortiori-but, alas, perhaps not-commentators on, and critics of,
judicial opinions who by hypothesis have more time for dialogue and reflection should also
pay attention to those whose moral judgments are sharply different from their own, and
should do so not to refute the views of others, but to learn from them.
53. In the course of his unsuccessful try for the Senate against Stephen Douglas,
Abraham Lincoln said the following about Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393
(1857):
We do not propose that when Dred Scott has been decided to be a slave by the
court, we, as a mob, will decide him to be free. . .. [W]e nevertheless do oppose
that decision as a political rule ... which shall be binding on the members of
Congress or the President to favor no measure that does not actually concur with
the principles of that decision. . . . We propose so resisting it as to have it
reversed if we can, and a new judicial rule established upon the subject.
POLITICAL DEBATES BETWEEN ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS (1895)
(Lincoln's speech of Oct. 13, 1858, at Quincy, Illinois). Alexander Bickel has referred to
these remarks as "heresy against the theoretical basis ofMarbury v. Madison." A. BICKEL,
THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 261 (1962).
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1960s borrowed the same rhetoric to explain why they were
standing in the schoolhouse doors, a conclusive presumption of
illegitimacy settled like a shroud over their actions.
The presumption, however, should not have been quite so
conclusive, for the lesson of the dialogic model ofjudicial review
is that the individual whose moral judgment-in-action counsels
disobedience will sometimes be a public official. By standing for
election to public office, an individual implicitly accepts the
essential justice of her society. But she does not thereafter sacri-
fice all independent moral judgment. The official who decides,
in the exercise of that moral judgment, that her society is just
but that a court's ruling is unjust, might simply criticize the
court. But she also might seek to defy the ruling of the court,
daring the judge to mete out punishment for contempt. This
was the attitude of some members of the Yonkers City Council
in the recent controversy over housing desegregation.54 Obvi-
ously, the officials who refused to comply with the court order,
or with the underlying consent decree, were being legally con-
temptuous. But the moral status of their actions is another mat-
ter. Their disobedience was open, and they accepted the court's
punishment, so they plainly met the criteria for morally legiti-
mate disobedience among those who consider their society essen-
tially just. Is there any moral reason that, due to their official
positions, they should have refrained?
I would suggest not. Public officials ought perhaps to give
very strong presumptive force to the moral norm that counsels
respect for and obedience to law in a just society. But when
their moral judgment counsels action that is disobedient, if in
their own minds the presumption is overcome, then they are in
the same position as other citizens. Yes, public officials should
deliberate long and hard on the effect of their disobedience,
including what they might teach about the ideal of respect for
law that they, through their public positions, surely seek to
inculcate. But outrage is outrage. If sufficiently outraged, pub-
lic officials ought to go ahead and disobey, provided only that
the test of proportionality is satisfied; that their disobedience is
public, so that it forms a part of the dialogue; and that they are
54. The trial court accepted the dare, although whether the contempt decree against
individual council members will hold up on appeal remains to be seen. See Spallone v.
United States, 109 S. Ct. 14 (1988) (mem.) (granting stay of lower court's contempt
judgment against individual council members).
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willing to stand punishment, if any, as a sign of their respect for
the law of their society.
This last aspect of official disobedience is a particularly
important one. I have argued earlier that every individual who
has come to view her society as essentially just has a strong rea-
son to obey its laws or suffer punishment for refusing to do so.
Public officials, elected or appointed to serve their constituents,
ought to view that one reason as particularly compelling. Unlike
individual citizens, who are safe from mandatory moral obliga-
tions because of the failure of social contract theory, the public
official has taken on a trust that includes an explicit affirmation
of obedience-certainly to the state, often to the laws or the
Constitution in so many words. The official's constituents can-
not approve or disavow actions of which they are unaware;
neither can anyone else. Consequently, a public official whose
moral judgment-in-action counsels disobedience should nearly
always conclude that open defiance and standing punishment are
appropriate. When public officials engage in open defiance, as
the Yonkers City Council did, their message to the courts is, in
effect: We respect you and the law that you must enforce, and
we invite you to punish us if you must, but through our example,
through our moral judgment-in-action, we also implore you to
consider our moral position, and the possibility of your own
moral error.
VI.
But what if the public official whose moral judgment-in-
action counsels disobedience is a judge? There may after all be
circumstances in which a judge's moral judgment-in-action
counsels disobedience in the sense of transgressing the rules of
her official function. John Ely indeed has suggested that a judge
who permits her personal moral choice to guide her constitu-
tional interpretations is by definition engaging in civil disobedi-
ence.55 Perry himself argues that the same moral reflectiveness
that should guide other members of society ought to guide
judges as well.56 One need not accept that model of the judicial
role to appreciate that situations might arise in which a judge
understands, in a self-conscious way, that her commission dic-
55. See J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 183
(1980).
56. M. PERRY, supra note 2, at 148-72.
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tates an action that her moral system forbids. This judge might
of course resign, but her moral system might forbid resignation.
If, for example, the judge feels herself compelled, as I heard in a
sermon not long ago, to use the levers of power to align herself
with the beloved of Christ, she could hardly surrender those
levers simply because they had been placed in her hands for
another purpose.
Or, to take another example, consider Catherine MacKin-
non's much-criticized comment about the judge who decided a
sex discrimination case in favor of Yale University, and who, in
the course of reaching her decision, evidently was required to
reject the testimony of a woman who claimed to have been
harassed by a member of the faculty. 57 MacKinnon wrote that
we-by whom she meant those who worked to put women in
positions of power-had expected more (that is, something dif-
ferent) of the judge, apparently because the judge was a
woman.58 The common-sense interpretation of her words is sim-
ply that the judge should have been particularly' sensitive to
nuances that judges used to miss in the days when judging was
largely a white male preserve. The subtext, so MacKinnon's
critics say, is that women in positions of authority should believe
everything that other women say, no matter what the state of the
evidence. This the critics have held to be an absurd and poten-
tially oppressive categorization.
But of course, MacKinnon's remark is a rhetorical flourish,
and her principal project is epistemological: The secret of femi-
nism, she says, is to believe what women say.59 Still, unless I
misunderstand her, she is not saying that no woman would ever
lie, even about something that a man had done. She is not even
talking about the facts of any given case. She is referring, rather,
to a habit of mind, an intuition that the sorts of things that
women say they experience, including sexual harassment, are
real. Her call, in consequence, is for listeners. who are sympa-
thetic and do not throw up barriers to belief because they
already doubt.
Thus, another way of conceptualizing her point about the
sexual harassment case against Yale (I make no claim that this is
57. See Alexander v. Yale Univ., 459 F. Supp. 1 (D. Conn. 1977), ajJ'd, 631 F.2d 178
(2d Cir. 1980).
58. C. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 220 (1987).
59. Id. at 113 (the "methodological secret" of feminism is that it "is built on believing
women's accounts of sexual use and abuse by men").
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the point that she was trying to make) is that it provides a link
between her larger epistemological project and the judicial role
in a particular case. No doubt fidelity to the prescriptive norms
of adjudication required the judge to decide the case on her read-
ing of the evidence before her, and this reading of the evidence
was that the student, a plaintiff, had not discharged her burden
of proving that the harassment took place.
But must this be the end of the matter? Mter all, the relief
sought in the case involved in large measure an order that Yale
establish a program for dealing with allegations of sexual harass-
ment. Perhaps a judge who reads and is convinced by MacKin-
non's argument might consider the establishment of such a
program something that Yale really ought to do, and might con-
sequently decide, in Ely's terms, to "stay[ ] on the bench and
engag[e] in a little judicial civil disobedience."60 "What differ-
ence does the evidence in this one case make?" the judge might
ask herself. "I know in my heart of hearts that women are the
subjects of sexual harassment, and frequently, even (especially?)
at places like Yale. So what if this plaintiff, because of the rules
of evidence, has been unable to prove that this particular act
took place? 1 need not believe that this woman has provided her
case in order to believe that women like this woman deserve pro-
tection from sexual harassment."
The judge who reasoned this way would be responding to
the larger truth that women are harassed. As a judge, she could
do something about this by granting judgment against Yale, not
because this case has been proven, but because (in her view) situ-
ations like the one alleged happen all the time. This line of rea-
soning clearly would not be in accord with the norms of the
judicial profession; in fact, it would appear absurd on its face.
Certainly it would therefore entail sacrifice, because it might
throw the judge, however briefly, into disrepute. The judge,
however, might have a different view. She might believe that by
requiring Yale to establish special procedures, she was striking a
much-needed blow against sexual harassment and in favor of sex
equality.61
My intention here is not to claim that judges should reason
this way, nor even to discover whether this really was MacKin-
non's meaning. My point, rather, is to suggest that a judge who
60. J. ELY, supra note 55, at 183.
61. I make no claim-and I don't believe MacKinnon does either-that women are
more likely than men to reason this way.
I
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carried out this project would be engaged in civil disobedience
precisely on Perry's model. She would recognize the injustice of
sexual harassment and be unwilling to be bound by professional
norms that, in her judgment, make it extraordinarily difficult for
courts to do anything about it. She would fight that injustice by
rendering a judgment that would force Yale to do something
about it.
Now, of course, judges are not selected in the expectation
that they will reason this way; on the contrary, no matter how
many clever scholars might know better, our public dialogue
insists that our judges are simply interpreting the law-not mak-
ing it. At the same time, it is difficult to explain the fundamental
rights strand of constitutional jurisprudence as anything other
than a process through which the Justices of the Supreme Court
determine the results that morality commands and then find
legal arguments to support their conclusions. That is not really
so different from what my hypothetical judge has done in the
sexual harassment case. The norms ofjudging, at least as articu-
lated publicly, do not permit judges to do what the Supreme
Court does all the time. But they do it anyway-which might
itself be described as a kind of civil disobedience. The question
is whether it is done in a way that promotes dialogue.
I said at the outset that an individual who believes her soci-
ety to be essentially just has at least one very strong reason for
breaking its laws openly and standing punishment after the law
has been broken. I also suggested that elected public officials
have a stronger reason for making their defiance open rather
than secret. I would simply add that judges, who are in our
mythos the law made manifest, have perhaps the strongest rea-
son of any actor to obey, or, when they do not obey, to be open
about their disobedience. In an important sense, a judge's diso-
bedience is always public, because the record of the case is there
to be seen, the precedents are available, and the reasoning is
plain on the face of the opinion. But in another sense, the judi-
cial disobedience would necessarily be secret, because an opinion
reading "I don't believe the plaintiff. Judgment for the plaintiff
anyway" would be overturned within days, if not hours. In
other words, the disobedience wouldn't work if it had to be fully
public. Because judges must explain their decisions, only a cov-
ert disobedience-only a lie, really-will suffice.
The proposition that judicial disobedience works best when
hidden weakens the moral justification for it, because judges
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have the strongest presumption in favor of obedience or open
defiance. Again, this is true only to the extent that the disobedi-
ent judge considers the society essentially just. But if the judge
does consider the society essentially just-if we are not asking
about a judge trying to halt a genocide or subvert the slave sys-
tem62-then the judge whose moral judgment-in-action counsels
disobedience should in most cases proclaim that disobedience to
the world by laying bare the moral content of her decision. This
plain and undisguised moral reasoning might in itself invite the
public dialogue that open, discoverable, and punishable disobe-
dience is meant to spark, and might therefore serve the same
purpo~e.
The unadorned truth might be that at least when the judge
interprets the Constitution, the personal moral content of her
decision will be patent, even if she tries to disguise it. For exam-
ple, most commentators seem to think that Roe v. Wade 63 is a
poorly written opinion. If the commentators are right, the rea-
son might be that Roe represents judicial disobedience-a lack of
fidelity to the prescriptive norms of judging. Certainly if that is
what the Supreme Court was up to, its act of defiance was open,
and it has sparked a public moral dialogue that shows no sign of
flagging. 64 Punishment has been meted out, too, in the sense
that the Court has itself become a prize that is battled for in the
political arena. But that is what one who, chooses disobedience
but respects the society and its law ought to expect.
Of course, liberal law is justifiably uncomfortable with the
idea that judges might act this way. Even Perry, in his effort to
transcend liberalism, is able to offer only a very small dissent
from orthodoxy on the judicial role. He will grant to judges a
certain freedom of moral action, but only within the particular
constraints on the judicial role. No other view makes much
62. For a sensitive and somewhat depressing analysis of the reasons that some anti-
slavery jUdges might have declined to use their commissions to advance their private moral
goals, see R. COVER, JUSTICE ACGUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS
(1975). '
63. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
64. Robert Burt has argued that in deciding Roe the way that it did, the Court has
frustrated public dialogue rather than enabled it. See Burt, Constitutional Law and the
Teaching ofthe Parables, 93 YALE L.J. 455, 487-88 n.l06 (1984); Burt, The Constitution of
the Family, 1979 SUP. CT. REV. 329, 371-73. Perry criticizes Roe on a somewhat different
ground. The problem, he says, is that the decision is premised on the proposition that "the
protection of fetal life is not a good of sufficient importance"-a proposition sufficiently
contested among "people of good will and high intelligence" that reliance on it "as a basis
for constitutional judgment" is "plainly imperial." M. PERRY, supra note 2, at 175.
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sense. Judges, after all, are the preeminent interpreters and even
prophets of law. Through their pronouncements, they seek to
bind others. Should the judges whose task it is to exemplify the
rule of law also be held as free as anyone else to disobey it, the
situation becomes, to say the least, morally and politically
awkward.
As a matter of ordinary conversation-the conversation in
which respect for law, including constitutional law, is inculcated
so that a continuous polity might survive-it is perfectly sensible
to treat judges as forbidden from engaging in disobedience of the
sort that other citizens remain morally free to undertake. This
need for respect for the law might help explain Perry's presump-
tion. But judges, no less than other individuals, have the human
character that Perry wants to preserve, and in that character
they might be as morally deliberative and reflective as anyone
else. And while it is not clear that we should encourage a moral
deliberation that leads to self-conscious judicial disobedience, we
should not consider it a moral outrage when it happens, so long
as the disobedient judges are open about their moral choices and
display a generosity and sensitivity to the moral visions of those
who disagree with them. In short, so long as the disobedience
invites a dialogue, it is good disobedience-not substantively
good or even procedurally good, but good for the moral deliber-
ation of a reflective society. If, on the other hand, the disobedi-
ent judges consider themselves free to defy the prescriptive
norms ofjudging, but arrogate to themselves the ultimate moral
authority of the society, with no concern for dialogue, then they
are engaging in bad disobedience.
The troubling question, however, is this: What precisely
does it mean for judges to engage in dialogue? The problem
arises every time the Supreme Court construes the Constitution
in a fashion that turns out to be not only controversial, but radi-
cally unpopular-radically unpopular in the sense that people
are not to be bullied from their opposition by opinion leaders
who counsel deference to the legitimate commands of duly con-
stituted authority, including courts. There is public protest.
Politicians join it. The interpretation in question becomes an
issue in election campaigns. There are growls about congres-
sional override, jurisdiction stripping, new Justices, constitu-
tional amendment. People are angry. The protest swirls like a
fire storm, and the Court is at the center, likely to be consumed
at any instant. Had the Supreme Court backed away from
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Brown v. Board ofEducation 65 in the face of massive resistance,
would that have represented morally reflective deliberation or
judicial cowardice? If, as appears quite possible, the Justices
should decide to limit or overturn Roe v. Wade, would they be
engaging in dialogue or shirking their duty?
The difficult truth-difficult, at least, in a world in which
law is supposed to be predictable-is that there is no way to
answer these questions ex ante, and there may not even be any
way to answer them ex post. The moral reasoning of a judge, the
commitment to dialogue, and the generosity and humility with
which she considers opinions different from her own, are ulti-
mately not matters capable of external ascertainment. We can-
not tell from the results of the process whether they are the
products of moral reflection. We can certainly try, for example
through the nomination and confirmation of Supreme Court Jus-
tices, to fill the bench with morally reflective individuals.66
Other than through exhortation and external criticism, however,
we cannot guarantee that those who are selected for the bench
will be morally reflective once they get there.
We can, however, make our own judgments, as individual
moral agents, about the rightness or wrongness of what the
courts decree. And as moral agents, we might decide, after simi-
lar deliberation, that our internal moral judgments-in-action
counsel disobedience. Martin Luther King's defiance of a
court's order prohibiting the Easter Sunday March in Birming-
ham was a shining example of moral judgment-in-action, even
though the Supreme Court was unimpressed.67 There is a prac-
tice in some parts of the country of holding organized prayer in
the public schools, no matter what the Supreme Court might say
about it.68 That, too, is moral judgment-in-action in defiance of
judicial decree. So is the intermittent effort by opponents ofRoe
v. Wade to convince the Congress to enact the so-called Human
Life Bill. 69
The point, in whatever case, is that the public deliberation
that should, in Perry's estimation, guide the society's moral
65. 347 U.s. 483 (1954).
66. See Carter, The Confirmation Mess, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1185, 1196-1201 (1988).
67. See Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967).
68. See J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS:
A FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT 147 (1980)
(summarizing empirical studies).
69. See generally Carter, The Morgan "Power" and the Forced Reconsideration of
Constitutional Decisions, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 819 (1986).
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judgments will quite likely be carried on in many different
forums and in many different forms. Sometimes the dissenters
will be among the governed, sometimes among the governors.
Nearly always there will be among the dissenters thoughtful,
generous individuals of good will. Courts, including constitu-
tional courts, that hand down decisions for what they consider
morally proper reasons ought to listen closely to moral dissent.
If the chorus of dissent rises, the confidence of the judges in the
correctness of their own moral visions ought perhaps to tremble
a bit.7o
And sometimes, although it is no easy matter to pin down
with empirical precision the cases where it has occurred, even
the Supreme Court will reverse a radically unpopular decision,
and the swarming dissent fades into history. A Court that backs
down frequently cannot possibly be said to be fulfilling its proper
role in the constitutional structure, for the fundamental law will
be malleable and imprecise. Besides, the purpose of urging the
judges to pay attention to the dissent is to promote the moral
dialogue necessary to the survival of a liberal polity. Interpreta-
tion of the Constitution's broadly worded clauses is simply not
possible in the absence of reliance on some moral vision. The
judges should listen to their critics because their critics may have
the better of the moral argument. Consequently, it makes con-
siderable difference whether the Court has backed down because
the Justices are convinced or because the Justices are afraid.
In either case, the Court has plainly backed down in the
face of protest. The classical liberal analysis might label this as
judicial· cowardice and condemn it as illegitimate. It is illegiti-
mate because the Justices are voting in a way that is different
from what they believe their commissions require. The distinc-
tion between the judge in my sexual harrassment hypothetical
and the Justices who have retreated in the face of protest is that
only in the first case is it likely that moral judgment-in-action is
provoking the judicial disobedience. On the other hand, the
Supreme Court's retreat in the second example might not be
quite so ignominious as it appears. It might instead reflect the
efficacy of public moral dialogue. Perhaps the Justices have
indeed changed their substantive views; perhaps in the conversa-
tion (not a monologue, remember), they have become convinced
70. For a further discussion of this point, see Carter, The Courts Are Not the
Constitution, Wall St. J., Feb. 7, 1989, at A24, col. 4.
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that the moral vision underlying the now-abandoned decision
was not as good as the competing vision urged upon them by an
angry public. The trouble is that there is no way to tell.
The Constitution might be a safer document, and judicial
review a somewhat more exacting science, if all the clauses spoke
with the relative precision that marks the provisions establishing
the structure of government-what I have called elsewhere our
Political Constitution.71 Then it would be far easier (although
still not trivial) to tell whether the judges called upon to inter-
pret it were doing their jobs. But the Political Constitution is
only a part of our Constitution. We also have a Natural Law
Constitution, comprising clauses so broadly worded that it is dif-
ficult to imagine interpreting or applying them without the aid of
moral judgment. We can appoint judges from among those peo-
ple we consider morally reflective; we can argue with them when
they are wrong, and try to convince them of their moral error;
and, in extremis, we can defy them. But if we are to have the
Constitution that we do, then we must also recognize that some-
times judges will do things that we very much dislike. And
sometimes they will do those things for very bad reasons.
VII.
Those who, like Perry and myself, are attracted to the Bick-
elian metaphor and think of courts as interlocutors in a continu-
ing moral dialogue, must face up to the difficulties. Those
difficulties are legion. Perhaps the most obvious is the problem
of speaking different languages. When one interlocutor wants to
argue over neutrality and reason and another insists that the
answer is found in divine revelation, there is little common
ground. The contemporary liberal solution is to prohibit one of
the languages-religion-in public moral dialogue. Perry's solu-
tion, more attractive but still not without its problems, would
permit individuals to enter the dialogue as they choose, provided
only that they enter with generosity of spirit and a genuine will-
ingness to listen to and consider the concerns of others. This
solution in itself reflects a moral judgment that some would
already reject; and yet it is cast in very attractive terms of char-
ity and redemption.
71. See generally Carter, Constitutional Adjudication and the Indeterminate Text: A
Preliminary Defense ofan Impeifect Muddle, 94 YALE L.J. 821 (1985); Carter, The Right
Questions in the Creation of Constitutional Meaning, 66 B.U.L. REV. 71 (1986).
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A second difficulty with dialogue is pointed out by the title
character of John Sayles's film Lianna who at one point tosses
out a splendid line that goes something like this: "Just because
you can argue better than me doesn't mean you're right." In
other words, reliance on dialogue as a means of resolving dis-
putes carries with it the risk that the dialogue will be resolved,
not according to substance, but according to skill. A third
weakness is that if the dialogue is taken to imply that even the
obligation of public officials to obey is willed, and therefore eva-
nescent, the theorist might end up defending not law, but anar-
chy. If these problems are to be resolved at all, their solutions
will likely be found in the development of dialogic norms teach-
ing, in the one case, the virtue of substance, and in the other, the
proposition that in most cases public officials have a special and
strong presumptive obligation to obey the law.
Finally, and perhaps most troubling of all, there is always
the risk, not an insubstantial one, that one side or another will
win, not because it has the better argument, but simply because
it wears the other down. There is no answer to this challenge,
except to note that, in a curious fashion, this possibility of
change through sheer perseverance also reflects an ultimately
positive judgment about human character-a judgment that
formed a vital part of Martin Luther King's optimism. Accord-
ing to King, people did not necessarily change because they
wanted to. People sometimes changed because they had to-
because they were worn down. In an essay not published until
after his death, King wrote:
America has not yet changed because so many think it
need not change, but this· is the illusion of the damned.
America must change because twenty-three million black citi-
zens will no longer live supinely in a wretched past. They have
left the valley of despair; they have found strength in struggle;
and whether they live or die, they shall never crawl nor retreat
again. Joined by white allies, they will shake the prison walls
until they fall. America must change.72
I do not know where or how to draw the line between a judicial
retreat in the face of superior force and a judicial understanding
of the Constitution that has been enriched through the process
of public moral dialogue. I have a faith, however, that one is
wrong and the other is right. I do know how to draw the line
72. M. KING, A Testament ofHope, in A TESTAMENT OF HOPE, supra note 3D, at
313, 328.
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between an individual who believes her society and its law to be
essentially just and one who does not; the line is drawn when she
decides whether she has a presumptive obligation to obey the
law just because it is the law-a decision that will in tum influ-
ence her determination whether to accept punishment for diso-
bedience. One either believes in the efficacy of dialogue in a just
society or one does not-but the one who does not cannot truly
believe that the society is just. The greatest love that one can
have for a society and its people, the greatest respect that one
can show for the differing moral visions that create the objec-
tionable law, is to sacrifice one's self-interest in order to change
them.
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